ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
ot all investors in financial markets have access to the same information about firm quality, leading to an adverse selection problem since informed investors use their information advantage in their trading (Akerlof, 1970) . This problem is likely to deepen capital market failures since it increases the number of transactions initiated by informed investors, which in turn increases transactions costs (e.g., O'Hara, 1995), widens dispersion in analyst forecasts (e.g., Zhang, 2006) , and increases the cost of firm capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997) .
Better corporate governance practices may mitigate the adverse selection problem and reduce information asymmetry (e.g., Chung et al., 2010) . Agency theory provides a conceptual framework in which to study the relation between governance mechanisms and information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Agency theory holds that the role of internal governance mechanisms and practices is important to ensuring that managers act in the best interests of shareholders, making decisions that maximize firm value and that guarantee a transparent environment to outsiders. Fama and Jensen (1983) hold that the board of directors is the most important internal governance mechanism. The effectiveness of boards of directors depends, to a large extent, on their size and composition. Jensen (1993) argues that small boards are more effective, since information sharing and decision making processes are easier in these structures. However, Anderson et al. (2004) , among others, argue that large boards ensure greater monitoring of the financial accounting process and improve firm transparency. Cai et al. (2006) , for instance, provide evidence that the adverse selection problem is less important in U.K. firms with large boards. Using a In addition to examining the board of directors, agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) presents managerial ownership as a governance mechanism that solves possible agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and that reduces potential agency costs. Managerial ownership is likely to reduce managers' discretionary behavior and to improve firm transparency, implying an improved firm information environment. There is limited empirical evidence on how managerial ownership affects the information environment. For instance, Attig et al. (2006) present evidence that firms with greater deviation between ownership and control exhibit higher information asymmetry. Unlike the entrenchment hypothesis, the incentive alignment hypothesis argues that managerial ownership can induce managers to adopt a self-serving attitude, to the detriment of other shareholders. Cheng and Warfield (2005) , among others, empirically support the entrenchment hypothesis and demonstrate that equity incentives promote earnings management. These authors document that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to sell shares in the future, and this motivates earnings management to increase the value of the shares to be sold. Baik et al. (2010) , however, demonstrate a negative relation between managerial ownership on the one hand, and analyst coverage and the likelihood of issuing earnings forecasts, on the other hand. These empirical findings are consistent with the hypothesis that managerial ownership leads to a more opaque information environment. According to signaling theory (Spence, 1973) , good corporate disclosure policy is a means to mitigate adverse selection problems and improve the firm information environment. Grossman (1981) uses signaling theory to explain how firm financial disclosures are useful to reducing information asymmetry.
Theoretical studies predict that high-quality disclosures mitigate information asymmetry, attract more uninformed investors, and reduce the incentive of informed investors to search for private information (e.g., Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) . Empirical research consistently shows that the quality of corporate disclosure, measured by the quality of earnings, negatively affects uncertainty and information asymmetry (Ascioglu et al., 2012) . Similarly, Heflin et al. (2005) and Brown and Hillegeist (2007) use voluntary disclosure scores and show that the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) find that the quality of annual reports reduces information asymmetry, proxied by the probability of informed trading.
In the spirit of existing studies, we focus on annual reports as the main vehicle for communication of both mandatory and voluntary information between the firm and its stakeholders (e.g., Neu et al., 1998) . Annual reports represent a key summary of firm performance indicators (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996) , and the level of information included is the best evidence of the level of firm disclosure (Zarb, 2007) . Many studies examining disclosure policies in annual reports (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993 ) demonstrate a positive relation between disclosure level and other forms of disclosure.
The present study extends the literature and sheds additional light on the role of corporate governance practices (board characteristics, managerial ownership, and voluntary disclosure) on firm information environment. The empirical analysis uses the B-convex method on a sample of 70 French listed firms belonging to the SBF120 index in 2007. The empirical findings show that 68.57% of our sample firms are efficient. Corporate governance mechanisms seem to effectively monitor the top executives of these firms, which improves their information-related decisions and reduces information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. A large proportion of our sample firms (31.42%) lies below the efficiency frontier, with efficiency scores different from 1. The corporate governance practices in these firms seem to be inefficient in improving the information environment. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our methodological approach. Section 3 outlines the sample, describes the data, and defines the inputs and outputs used in the B-convex method. Section 4 reports and discusses the main empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 sets forth our conclusions.
METHODOLOGY: B-CONVEX METHOD
Using a non-parametric approach, the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method estimates the production frontiers distinguishing the efficient production units of those that are less. It is a tool with a growing interest in the field of operations research. Inasmuch as most of the social organization can be assimilated as a Decision Making Units transforming a set input to a set of output, therefore the scope of the DEA method is highly large. The Bconvex analysis is an innovate method in DEA introduced by Briec and Liang (2011) . The advantage of this method is that it relaxes the assumption of convexity in the consideration of the production set. Now we will briefly present the definitions and results used in this paper, for more technical details readers can refer to Briec and Liang (2011) . 
is called a B-Convex estimation of the production technology. It assumes that a company can produce a greater quantity of outputs when she can use a greater quantity of inputs. When the maximum of two input bundles are feasible, then the maximum they produce is also feasible. The figure 1 illustrates the frontier of B-Convex production technology.
Figure 1. B-Convex Production Technology
B-Convexity includes, as a special case, a situation where inputs are assumed to be freely disposable. The B-Convexity approach implies, under this assumption, that the production set has an output cubic structure. In other words, an assumption of output complementarity is implicitly made on the technology. We employ the Farrell measure over the B-convex non-parametric technologies developed by Briec and Liang (2011). 
DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION

Sample Selection And Data Sources
Our starting point is all French listed firms belonging to the SBF120 in 2007. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), because they are subject to specific disclosure requirements, and firms with missing data. Our final sample consists of 70 firms. We focus on the SFB120 firms because they are more likely to disclose detailed information in their annual reports and to adopt good governance practices. During the 2000s, French firms that won annual report awards were among the SBF120 firms. Corporate governance data are handcollected from firm annual reports available on the AMF website. 2 Financial data are retrieved from the Worldscope Database. Stock price returns are from the Datastream database.
Outputs
This research uses a B-convex approach to examine the association between corporate governance, voluntary disclosure, and firm information environment for a sample of SBF120 firms. We consider three outputs that proxy for the quality of the firm information environment. First, we examine annual average effective bid-ask spreads (Spread), which is calculated as the yearly average of daily effective bid-ask spreads. Consistent with Lin et al. (1995) and Heflin et al. (2005) , we measure the daily effective spread as twice the absolute value of the difference between a transaction price and the midpoint of the bid and ask prices. It is computed using the following formula:
1 Mathemtica is used to program the algorithm that calculates the efficiency scores. To assess annual average spread, we divide the sum of daily effective spreads by the total number of trading days during the quotation year.
Second, we examine analyst forecasts error (AnaError), which is measured as the absolute value of actual earnings per share minus average forecasted earnings per share, divided by the share price at the beginning of the year. Finally, we use the average standard deviation of stock return (StdReturn) as a proxy of the firm information environment.
Inputs
The first input is the score of voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Score), measured using a selfconstructed "disclosure index. Table 1 presents the checklist of items included in the disclosure scores. 3 We use three additional corporate governance inputs: Managerial ownership (ManagerOwn) is the proportion of shares held by top management. Board independence (BoardIndp) is the ratio of independent to total directors on the board. Board size (BoardSize) is the total number of directors on the board. It also shows which items overlap those in existing studies. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the input variables. Voluntary disclosure in annual reports dramatically varies among sample firms. Score has a mean (median) of 48.28 (48.50) and ranges from 26 to 73 with a standard deviation of 11.50. One-quarter of sample firms disclose less than 38 among 112 items, despite publication of several codes of best corporate governance practices in the past two decades that encourage information disclosure. This conforms with the conclusions drawn by Fitch Ratings that French firms would benefit from better financial disclosure and accountability policies. Board size also exhibits wide dispersion across the sampled firms. On average, French boards are composed of 11 directors. Board size ranges from 4 to 21 directors. Board independence varies dramatically across sample firms. Independent directors represent, on average, half the directors of French boards. However, some boards are fully independent, whereas others are composed exclusively of insiders. Managerial ownership shows systematic differences across sample firms. It ranges from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 99%, with a mean (median) value of 13.39% (3). These results are consistent with the findings of Barros et al. (2013) and Botti et al. (2014) , who show that French listed firms do not exhibit similar corporate governance practices. 
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The present paper sheds some light on the role of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure on the firm information environment. Our model is output-oriented because we consider that the quality of the firm information environment depends mainly on corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., board of directors and ownership structure) and voluntary disclosure decisions. Table 3 provides efficiency scores for sample firms. Firms are defined as Decision Managerial Unities (DMUs). The efficiency scores are the solution of the optimization program presented in Section 2. 
